This is the paid companion to “China’s Cooking Oil Is Coming Back to America. The Math Says It Cannot Last.” The free piece set out the headline finding: operating SAF capacity globally already needs more lipid feedstock than China exported in its record year, and the April reopening does not change that.

This brief is the project-level read. It walks through which specific facilities are positioned where, and what each scenario for Chinese UCO flows means for them.

The dataset

The analysis is built on the Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker, a structured database of every commercial-stage SAF project globally. The current edition contains 279 projects across 53 countries. Each project carries a full technical and commercial profile: operator, location, technology pathway, feedstock list, capacity, project stage, commissioning probability, source documentation, and last verification date.

For this brief, the relevant subset is the HEFA pathway, which uses lipid feedstocks (UCO, tallow, palm fatty acid distillate, vegetable oils) processed through hydrotreatment. HEFA is the dominant SAF technology today and will remain so through at least 2030. Of the 145 HEFA projects in the Tracker, 126 list UCO or mixed waste oils among their feedstocks. Those 126 projects are the universe for this analysis.

A note on capacity figures used here:

• Gross SAF capacity is the total annual SAF output a project would deliver if it commissioned on schedule and ran at nameplate. It is the announcement number.

• Weighted SAF capacity is gross capacity adjusted for the probability that the project actually commissions. Operating projects sit at 100% probability. Construction-stage projects run at 90% as a baseline. FID-stage at 70%. Pre-FID at 40%. Announced concepts at 20%. Cancelled at 0%. The Tracker also adjusts these baselines up or down on a project-by-project basis where evidence warrants.

• Implied lipid feedstock demand is calculated by applying a 1.20 hydroprocessing yield ratio to the SAF capacity. This is the standard industry figure: 1.20 kilograms of lipid feedstock yields 1 kilogram of SAF.

UCO is one of several lipid feedstocks that go into the 1.20 figure. The actual UCO share at any given plant depends on operator sourcing, certification, and price. Those decisions shift in real time. The structural demand for the lipid feedstock category, however, is contracted by the project itself.

The headline numbers

Operating projects alone, with their probability of commissioning fixed at 100% because they are already running, require approximately 7,457 kilotonnes per year of lipid feedstock. That is roughly 2.5 times China’s record 2024 export volume. UCO is a portion of that lipid demand. The rest is covered by tallow, PFAD, and vegetable oils. But the competitive pressure on UCO molecules is set by the size of the lipid pool, not just the share of UCO within it.

Now to the project-level breakdown.

The three buckets

The 126 projects sort cleanly into three strategic groups based on how each is positioned against the China UCO trade flow.

Bucket 1: Inside China (the retention story)

Nineteen Chinese HEFA UCO projects. These are the plants that are taking UCO out of the export pool simply by existing. Combined gross capacity 4,357 kt/yr. Combined weighted capacity 3,208 kt/yr.

Operating and construction-stage Chinese projects together account for 2,632 kt/yr of weighted SAF capacity. At the 1.20 yield ratio, that implies roughly 3,160 kt/yr of lipid feedstock demand inside China. If even half of that is sourced as UCO, the domestic Chinese UCO requirement from this segment alone approaches the entire 2024 Chinese export pool. The construction-stage projects below will commission over the next 24 to 36 months.

The largest operating and ramp-stage Chinese plants:

SINOPEC Zhenhai is independently RSB-certified. The Chinese ramp pipeline will roughly double the country’s operating UCO-using SAF capacity within three years.

Bucket 2: The United States (the arbitrage beneficiaries)

Nine US HEFA UCO projects. Three are operating. Two are under construction. The remaining four are pre-FID, announced, or on hold. The full US picture:

Read more

On 28 April, Bloomberg reported that two cargoes of Chinese used cooking oil totaling roughly 339,000 barrels arrived in the United States over the past month. About half went to Port Arthur, Texas, the home of Diamond Green Diesel. These were the largest UCO imports of 2026 and the first meaningful shipments since the Trump administration imposed a 125% tariff in April 2025 that effectively closed the trade.

The narrative writing itself in trade media this week is straightforward. US blending mandates are climbing. Soybean oil and tallow have hit multi-year and record highs. The Iran conflict is pushing oil and fertilizer prices up. So American renewable diesel producers are paying enough to absorb the tariff and bring Chinese UCO back through the door.

That narrative is correct, and it is incomplete. The supply available to come back through that door is much smaller than it was in 2024, and it is shrinking for reasons that have nothing to do with US trade policy.

The structural number

Sustainable aviation fuel plants that are already operating around the world, and that list used cooking oil among their feedstocks, have a combined SAF output capacity of roughly 6,200 kilotonnes per year. To produce that SAF, those plants need to draw in approximately 7,400 kilotonnes per year of lipid feedstock. UCO, tallow, palm fatty acid distillate, and vegetable oils all compete inside that requirement, and the mix shifts with prices and certification rules.

China’s used cooking oil exports in 2024 hit an all-time record of roughly 3,000 kilotonnes. That was the absolute peak under the most favourable conditions: US arbitrage open, Chinese export tax rebates intact, no domestic SAF competition for the molecule.

Operating SAF capacity already eats more lipid feedstock, in total, than China sent to the world in its best-ever year. Even if UCO accounts for only half of that operating SAF feedstock pool, the implied UCO demand from operating SAF facilities alone is in the same range as China’s entire record export volume. And that is before adding the global renewable diesel fleet, which is several times larger than the SAF fleet and uses the same feedstock.

That is the structural picture. The April cargoes do not change it.

Why China keeps shrinking as a supplier

Three things are happening inside China that take UCO molecules out of the export pool, regardless of what Washington does.

First, Beijing removed UCO export tax rebates in late 2024 and has not reinstated them. That alone reduces the economic incentive for Chinese exporters.

Second, China has built and is building a domestic SAF industry. The first commercial Chinese SAF plants began operating in 2024 and 2025. Several more are under construction. These plants run on Chinese UCO that previously moved offshore.

Third, China has also been expanding domestic renewable diesel and biodiesel capacity, which competes with SAF for the same feedstock pool.

The combined effect is that Chinese UCO export volumes have been declining since late 2024, well before the US tariff, and they continue to decline now even as the April 2026 cargoes show that some arbitrage is reopening at the right price. The supply that can come back is a smaller share of a smaller pool.

Three numbers worth holding

~6,200 kt/yr. Operating SAF capacity globally that depends on used cooking oil among its feedstocks. This is contracted demand competing for every available tonne of waste oil.

~3,000 kt/yr. China’s record 2024 UCO exports. The April 2026 cargoes do not lift the ceiling on how much Chinese UCO can be available to global buyers in any year. They redistribute it.

Three. The number of operating SAF plants in the United States that list UCO among their feedstocks. The American buyer base for Chinese UCO at the SAF level has not expanded since 2024. The competition for it has.

What this means commercially

For renewable diesel and SAF producers in the US, the April reopening is welcome margin relief but not a structural fix. The molecule that made it through this month is the same molecule that European and non-China Asian producers were planning to source. Some Chinese UCO is now flowing west again. Some that would have flowed to Europe or Singapore is being redirected to Port Arthur. The total available pool has not grown.

For European producers, the April reopening is a soft pricing headwind. Chinese UCO that lands in Houston is Chinese UCO that does not land in Rotterdam. The EU has been the net beneficiary of the 2025 trade redirection. That benefit is partially reversing.

For feedstock traders and analysts, the durable signal is the structural one. Chinese domestic SAF capacity is growing. Beijing’s policy signals point to retaining more UCO at home. The 2024 export pool was a peak, not a baseline.

For aviation fuel buyers and offtake counterparties, the implication is that UCO-derived SAF supply has a tighter ceiling than the SAF capacity buildout might suggest. Project announcements based on assumed UCO availability deserve a second look against the export math.

Caveats

The supply-demand math above is based on a structured database of every commercial-stage SAF project worldwide that Axial Intelligence maintains. The 6,200 kt/yr operating SAF capacity figure and the 7,400 kt/yr lipid feedstock requirement are both derived from that dataset using a documented yield ratio for hydroprocessing. UCO share within multi-feedstock plants is operator-decided and shifts with prices and policy. The April reopening is recent. Two cargoes do not establish a trend.

The full project-level breakdown is in the paid edition. It identifies every operating, construction-stage, and FID-stage SAF facility worldwide that depends on UCO, ranked by capacity and grouped by region, country, and operator. It separates Chinese plants that are taking UCO out of the export pool from European and non-China Asian plants that compete with US Gulf Coast buyers for what remains. It includes operator-level rankings and the implied feedstock pull from the construction pipeline that will commission over the next two to three years.

[Subscribe to access the project-level data and the next edition of the SAF Project Tracker.]

Data: Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker, April 2026. Market reporting: Bloomberg, Transport Topics, Reuters, advancedbiofuelsusa.info, Biofuels International, ResourceWise, 28 April 2026 reporting cycle and prior coverage.

Axial Intelligence · SAF Project Tracker · April 2026

The companion free post established three findings: SAF's relative cost premium over conventional jet fuel has compressed, the Middle East SAF pipeline is directly exposed to the conflict, and policy frameworks face a stress test. This paid edition provides the project-level evidence, the feedstock routing analysis, the mandate-risk framework, and updated scenario modelling.

Premium post contains:

1. Market Context

2. Full Middle East SAF Projects Table, and conflict exposure assessment

3. Feedstock Routing Disruption

4. Mandate at Risk Assessment

5. Scenario Analysis: Sustained Disruption vs Recovery

6. Implications for airlines, investors, feedstock traders, and policymakers.

7. Data access via premium platform

1. Market Context: The Jet Fuel Shock in Numbers

The Strait of Hormuz has been closed since 2 March 2026. On 17 April, Iran announced a brief reopening for the duration of the US-Iran ceasefire. On 18 April, Iran reimposes

restrictions in response to the continued US naval blockade of Iranian ports. The strait remains closed as of 22 April. The closure is now into its eighth week and is the most severe jet fuel supply disruption on record (Al Jazeera, NPR, CNN, 17-18 April 2026).

Key price reference points, using data from the Argus US Jet Fuel Index (simple average of Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and New York spot assessments, published under license to Airlines for America):

The decline from $4.88 to $3.99 reflects market response to the brief 17 April Hormuz reopening and to arbitrage inflows from the US and other non-Gulf sources. Prices remain well above pre-crisis levels and the second closure on 18 April has halted the downward move. IEA executive director Fatih Birol warned on 16 April that Europe has approximately six weeks of jet fuel stocks remaining if Hormuz does not reopen. Independent jet fuel stocks at the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) hub fell to a six-year low in the week ending 15 April (Argus Media).

S&P Global Platts data for 4 March 2026 showed US West Coast conventional jet at $3.59/gallon and California HEFA-SPK SAF at $8.85/gallon, a 147% premium, down from a pre-crisis premium of approximately 223%. SAF prices are driven primarily by feedstock and processing economics (which have risen modestly), while conventional jet is driven by crude oil and refinery utilisation (both severely disrupted). The SAF-to-jet multiple on the 4 March snapshot narrowed from approximately 3.2x to 2.5x.

2. Full Middle East SAF Projects Table

All 15 tracked SAF projects in the Middle East, ordered by gross capacity.

Asterisk (*) denotes analyst-adjusted probability below stage baseline. Three projects carry downward adjustments:

• Aramco / TotalEnergies / SIRC (Announced baseline 0.20 → 0.10)

• MENA Biofuels Fujairah Phase II (Pre-FID baseline 0.40 → 0.30)

• LanzaTech / IFC Oman (Announced baseline 0.20 → 0.10)

These adjustments were applied prior to the current conflict based on limited project-specific evidence or elevated developer risk, and reduce the region’s weighted total by 33 kt relative to what stage baselines alone would produce. A pure stage-baseline-weighted total would be approximately 467 kt. Under current conditions, the case for further downward adjustment across the region has strengthened.

Conflict exposure assessment

Turkey (2 projects, 400 kt gross, 140 kt weighted). Sits outside the direct conflict zone but faces elevated energy costs and regional instability risk. Turkish projects are less exposed than Gulf-based facilities. The Tüpraş İzmir project (Pre-FID, 300 kt) is the region’s largest single weighted contributor at 120 kt.

Saudi Arabia (4 projects, 505.5 kt gross, 85.5 kt weighted). Faces direct infrastructure risk. The East-West Pipeline, Saudi Arabia’s primary crude export bypass from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, was struck in a drone attack on 8 April, reducing throughput by approximately 700,000 barrels per day. Saudi Arabia announced full-capacity restoration on 12 April (Bloomberg, 8 April 2026; East-West Pipeline operator updates). The SATORP co-processing unit (5 kt operating) is at the Jubail refinery complex on the Gulf coast. The NEOM e-fuel demonstration plant has sub-1 kt disclosed capacity reflecting its pilot-to-commercial phasing and depends on green hydrogen infrastructure at early construction stage.

UAE (6 projects, 475 kt gross, 173 kt weighted). Has experienced direct attacks on port facilities. The Kuwaiti VLCC Al Salmi was struck by an Iranian drone while anchored at the Port of Dubai on 31 March, causing a fire (IRGC claims via Tasnim News Agency; Wikipedia compilation, 31 March 2026). ADNOC Refining’s small co-processing unit (5 kt) is exposed. The Pre-FID projects (Masdar/Tadweer bio-SAF, MENA Biofuels HEFA units) face elevated financing risk as regional capital markets absorb the conflict’s economic impact.

Oman (3 projects, 192 kt gross, 35.4 kt weighted). Geographically adjacent to the strait. All three projects are Announced-stage and carry high exposure scores. Development timelines are likely to extend.3. Feedstock Routing Disruption.

3. Feedstock Routing Disruption

The tracker estimates total feedstock demand from all non-cancelled projects at 63,694 kt/yr, with 26,372 kt (41%) classified as waste oils and fats under the tracker’s normalised primary-feedstock taxonomy. A significant share of global UCO and tallow trade routes through or past the Strait of Hormuz, particularly flows from Southeast Asian collection markets to European HEFA refineries.

Key disruption channels

Read more

The Strait of Hormuz remains closed. On 17 April, Iran’s foreign minister announced the strait was open to commercial traffic for the duration of the US-Iran ceasefire. Oil prices fell approximately 11% on the announcement. On 18 April, Iran reversed course and reinstated restrictions, citing the continued US naval blockade of Iranian ports as the reason. The strait has been effectively closed since 2 March, with a 24-hour window of partial reopening on 17 April (Al Jazeera, NPR, CNN, 17-18 April 2026).

Jet fuel prices across major hubs remain well above pre-crisis levels, though they have retreated from the early April peak. The Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker, covering 279 projects and approximately 19.5 Mt/yr of probability-weighted capacity, provides a structured lens on three questions that matter for SAF market participants as the crisis enters its eighth week.

1. Jet Fuel Is Volatile, SAF Is Structurally Less Responsive

Conventional jet fuel prices have moved in three phases since the crisis began.

Using same-source data from the Argus US Jet Fuel Index (a simple average of Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and New York spot assessments, published daily by Argus Media under license to Airlines for America):

• Pre-crisis (27 February 2026, one day before the US and Israel began strikes on Iran): $2.50/gallon

• Crisis peak (2 April 2026, four weeks after the Hormuz closure): $4.88/gallon, a 95% rise from pre-crisis

• Latest (21 April 2026, three days after the second Hormuz closure): $3.99/gallon, down 18% from the peak but still 60% above pre-crisis

The decline from $4.88 to $3.99 reflects market response to the brief 17 April Hormuz reopening and to arbitrage flows from the US and other non-Gulf sources. Prices remain well above pre-crisis levels, and the second closure on 18 April has halted the downward move.

S&P Global Platts data from 4 March 2026 showed US West Coast conventional jet at $3.59/gallon and California HEFA-SPK SAF at $8.85/gallon, a 147% premium, down from a pre-crisis premium of approximately 223%. SAF prices are driven primarily by feedstock and processing economics, which have risen modestly. Conventional jet is driven by crude oil and refinery utilisation, both severely disrupted.

Note: Same-source, same-date SAF pricing for 21 April 2026 is not available in public sources at time of publication. The 4 March Platts snapshot is retained as a reference point for the premium-compression finding.

For airlines evaluating long-term offtake agreements, the structural argument strengthens: when conventional jet fuel can rise 95% in four weeks and fall 18% in two, fixed-price SAF contracts look less like a sustainability cost and more like a volatility hedge. That logic holds even as jet fuel retreats from its peak.

2. The Middle East Pipeline Is Directly Exposed

The Axial Intelligence tracker covers 15 SAF projects in the Middle East, across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Turkey, with a combined gross capacity of 1,572 kt/yr and probability-weighted capacity of approximately 434 kt/yr.

The exposure profile of this regional pipeline is stark:

• Only 2 projects (10 kt combined) are Operating. Both are small-scale co-processing units.

• 5 projects (720 kt gross, 278 kt weighted) are at Pre-FID.

• 7 projects (842 kt gross, 145 kt weighted) are at Announced stage.

• 1 Construction-stage project (the NEOM e-fuel demonstration plant in Saudi Arabia, demo-scale at sub-1 kt) accounts for the remainder.

More than 99% of the region’s gross capacity sits at Pre-FID or Announced, stages that carry 40% and 20% baseline commissioning probabilities respectively. Under current conditions, with Hormuz closed for the second time in two months, damaged regional refining infrastructure, and elevated financing risk, those probability assignments may prove generous.

Probability disclosure: Three of the 15 regional projects carry analyst-adjusted probabilities below their stage baseline, reducing the regional weighted capacity by approximately 33 kt versus a pure stage-baseline calculation. The 434 kt figure reflects those adjustments. A pure stage-baseline-weighted total would be approximately 467 kt.

The practical consequence: the Middle East’s 434 kt of weighted SAF capacity, already modest at 2.2% of the global weighted total, faces material downside risk. Projects that depend on imported feedstock, Gulf port access, or regional energy infrastructure for green hydrogen production are in the most exposed position.

3. Policy Frameworks Are Already Adjusting

Three policy and industry responses have emerged since the first edition of this analysis.

Singapore (25 March 2026). The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore deferred the SAF Levy by six months. The levy will now apply to tickets sold from 1 October 2026 (previously 1 April 2026), for flights departing from 1 January 2027 (previously 1 October 2026). CAAS attributed the deferral directly to the Middle East conflict. Singapore’s 1% SAF uplift target shifts from 2026 to 2027. Source: CAAS press release, 25 March 2026.

Singapore’s levy is not a hard blending mandate; it is a fixed-rate passenger ticket charge that funds central SAF procurement by CAAS. Even so, the deferral is the first formal SAF policy action publicly attributed to the Hormuz crisis.

European Union (22 April 2026). The European Commission is publishing today a contingency package addressing jet fuel and diesel availability, refinery capacity, and energy security. According to drafts reported by Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, and Reuters ahead of publication, the package includes coordinated monitoring of fuel stocks, a new jet fuel observatory, potential joint purchasing of kerosene, possible release of emergency reserves, and measures to boost SAF production. The IEA warned on 16 April that Europe has approximately six weeks of jet fuel stocks remaining if Hormuz does not reopen. Independent jet fuel stocks at the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp hub fell to a six-year low in the week ending 15 April (Argus Media, 16 April 2026).

For the SAF pipeline, the EU response points in two directions at once: short-term demand-side pressure on the ReFuelEU 2% mandate as airlines cut capacity and costs rise, and medium-term supply-side support if the Commission follows through on SAF production measures.

Airline capacity cuts. Aer Lingus announced on 19 April that it will cut approximately 500 flights over the summer. Lufthansa has permanently withdrawn 27 aircraft from its CityLine regional subsidiary. Air France-KLM has cut selected routes. United Airlines moved in March to reduce approximately 5% of planned Q2 and Q3 capacity. These cuts reduce aviation’s near-term SAF blending obligation in absolute terms, even where percentage mandates remain unchanged.

What the Full Tracker Reveals

The project-level analysis, including which Middle East facilities face the highest compound risk, which feedstock supply chains are most disrupted, and how mandate delays and airline capacity cuts affect weighted capacity by region, is available to Axial Intelligence subscribers.

The premium platform tracks all 279 projects across 104 analytical fields, with scenario modelling (bear/base/bull), exposure scoring, feedstock demand allocation, and timeline analysis.

→ Subscribe to access the full Middle East project table, feedstock routing analysis, and mandate-at-risk assessment.

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Analysis date: 22 April 2026. Tracker data cut: April 2026 (279 projects). Jet fuel prices from Argus US Jet Fuel Index via Airlines for America (21 April 2026, 2 April 2026, 27 February 2026). SAF premium reference from S&P Global Platts (US West Coast and California, 4 March 2026); same-source, same-date SAF pricing for 22 April was not publicly available at time of publication. Singapore SAF Levy information from CAAS press release (25 March 2026). EU jet fuel measures from Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Reuters, and RTE reporting (19-22 April 2026). Airline capacity actions from public carrier announcements (March-April 2026). The Strait of Hormuz remains closed as of 22 April following the 18 April re-closure. All findings should be read as conditional on the persistence of current disruption levels.

Source: Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker, data cut April 2026. Market data, policy data, and corporate actions attributed inline.

The companion free post established the headline finding: probability weighting reduces the global SAF pipeline from 39.7 Mt/yr gross to 19.5 Mt/yr, a 51% discount. This paid edition provides the operator-level evidence, the scenario range, the regional discount map, and the exposure-band overlay that explains where inflation concentrates and what it means for specific market participants.

1. The Three Scenarios: Bounding the Pipeline

The Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker generates three capacity scenarios from the same 279-project dataset.

The bull scenario differs from gross only in its treatment of On Hold (3 projects, 634 kt halved to 317 kt) and Cancelled (8 projects, 735 kt zeroed). The practical spread between bull and base is 19.1 Mt/yr, the largest gap in the scenario framework, reflecting the distance between aspiration and probability-adjusted reality.

The bear scenario applies an additional downside multiplier derived from a four-factor exposure model. Projects scoring High (cumulative 6-8 on four risk dimensions) receive a 0.80 multiplier on base capacity. Medium (3-5) receives 0.90. Low (0-2) passes through unchanged. The base-to-bear gap is 1.3 Mt/yr (6.6%), a relatively narrow downside that reflects the fact that most weighted capacity is already concentrated in Operating and Construction stages where exposure multipliers have limited effect.

2. Operator-Level Probability Discount: Top 20

The following table ranks the 20 largest operators by gross announced SAF capacity and shows the absolute and percentage discount after probability weighting.

Read more

The global SAF project pipeline now tracks 279 projects with a combined announced capacity of 39.7 Mt/yr. That figure appears in conference slides, investor decks, and policy documents as evidence that the industry is scaling rapidly.

It is also misleading.

After applying stage-level commissioning probabilities, a framework that discounts each project according to its development maturity, the pipeline retains 19.5 Mt/yr. The discount is 51%.

This is not a rounding error or a modelling artefact. It is the gap between what has been announced and what is realistically deliverable, and it is large enough to reshape assumptions about SAF supply adequacy through the end of the decade.

Where the Discount Falls

The probability discount does not apply evenly. It concentrates in the stages where most of the announced capacity sits, and where the distance to commercial production is greatest.

The 54 projects classified as Operating carry a commissioning probability of 1.00. Their 6.3 Mt/yr of capacity passes through the model unchanged, representing every kilotonne of SAF actually being produced today.

Construction-stage projects (31 tracked) retain 86% of gross capacity, reflecting EPC contracts signed and physical works underway. The 5.8 Mt/yr gross becomes 5.0 Mt/yr weighted.

From there, the discount steepens:

• FID (5 projects): 965 kt gross, 702 kt weighted, a 27% discount.

• Pre-FID (92 projects): 18,844 kt gross, 6,187 kt weighted, a 67% discount. This single stage accounts for nearly half of all announced capacity and absorbs the largest absolute reduction in the pipeline.

• Announced (77 projects): 6,410 kt gross, 1,265 kt weighted, an 80% discount.

• Cancelled (8 projects): 735 kt removed entirely.

The pattern is clear. The stages that dominate headline pipeline figures are precisely the stages that probability weighting discounts most aggressively.

Why the Gap Matters

SAF supply projections derived from gross announced capacity systematically overstate the realistic near-term outlook. This has direct consequences for three groups.

For airlines signing offtake agreements against pipeline expectations, the deliverable supply base is roughly half what headline figures suggest. Procurement strategies built on gross totals risk overpromising availability to corporate sustainability programmes.

For investors modelling SAF market size, the denominator is wrong. A developer claiming 2% market share of a 39.7 Mt pipeline is actually competing in a 19.5 Mt weighted market, doubling implied competitive intensity.

For policymakers calibrating mandates against expected supply, the gap between gross announcements and probability-weighted delivery is the margin of error in mandate feasibility. A mandate designed around 39.7 Mt of supply faces a different compliance picture when realistic delivery is 19.5 Mt.

The Pre-FID Concentration Problem

The most consequential finding in the waterfall is the Pre-FID stage. At 92 projects and 18.8 Mt/yr of gross capacity, Pre-FID accounts for 48% of the entire announced pipeline. After probability weighting at a baseline 0.40 (with analyst adjustments where warranted), it retains 6.2 Mt/yr.

The 12.7 Mt/yr that disappears in this single stage is larger than the entire operating SAF base globally. It represents projects that have progressed to FEED or licensor selection but have not yet secured financing. Many will advance. Many will not. The probability model reflects this reality; headline figures do not.

What the Full Tracker Reveals

The stage-level discount is the entry point. The deeper analysis, available to Axial Intelligence subscribers, includes the operator-level probability discount table (which developers carry the largest gap between gross and weighted capacity), the three-scenario comparison (bear at 18.2 Mt, base at 19.5 Mt, bull at 38.6 Mt), and the exposure-band overlay showing which projects within each stage carry elevated multi-factor risk.

The full SAF Project Tracker, covering all 279 projects across 104 analytical fields, is accessible through the Axial Intelligence premium dashboard.

→ Subscribe to access the full operator ranking, scenario sensitivity analysis, and project-level probability data.

Subscribe now

Methodology: Probability-weighted capacity applies stage-level commissioning probabilities (Operating 1.00, Construction 0.90, FID 0.70, Pre-FID 0.40, Announced 0.20, Cancelled 0.00) to each project’s modelled SAF capacity. The two-tier system permits analyst adjustments within defined bands where project-specific evidence warrants departure from baseline. Full methodology documentation is available to subscribers.

Source: Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker v44, 279 projects, data cut April 2026.

A market intelligence publication is only as useful as the discipline behind its data. Before reading analysis from this platform, it helps to understand how project data is collected, classified, standardised, and quality-checked. This note sets out the framework used in the Axial Intelligence SAF Project Tracker and explains how the publication turns a noisy pipeline of project announcements into a more decision-useful view of likely SAF supply.

What gets tracked

The SAF Project Tracker covers global projects involved in the production of sustainable aviation fuel across the full development cycle, from early concept announcements through to commercial operation. Coverage includes dedicated SAF plants, flexible renewable fuels facilities with SAF production capability, refinery co-processing units, alcohol-to-jet facilities, Fischer-Tropsch gasification plants, and power-to-liquid installations.

A project is included when it meets three conditions: it produces or is credibly planned to produce SAF as a primary or significant co-product; it has been publicly announced by the developer, confirmed by a government source, or identified in a credible trade publication; and sufficient information exists to assign at minimum a country, technology pathway, and project stage. Projects are excluded where they relate only to renewable diesel or HVO with no credible SAF pathway, where they are limited to blending or distribution infrastructure rather than fuel production, or where they duplicate an existing tracked entry.

The tracker does not claim complete global coverage. It is a bounded project universe built on what can be verified. Coverage gaps remain, particularly in parts of China where plant-level data is harder to confirm, in some African markets where project-level disclosure is still thin, in European co-processing sub-units embedded within larger refinery systems, and in US biorefinery conversions where SAF splits are not always separately disclosed. All analytical claims published through this platform are therefore bounded to the tracked project universe and should not be read as global constants.

How capacity is handled

The tracker follows a strict capacity derivation chain rather than treating all published numbers as interchangeable. At the broadest level, nameplate capacity captures total renewable fuels output at the facility level. Where a source discloses SAF-specific output, that figure is recorded as estimated SAF capacity and is the preferred basis. Where a source discloses total renewable fuels capacity but not a SAF split, modelled SAF capacity is derived using pathway-specific SAF share assumptions. That modelled SAF capacity is the single capacity basis used across the scenario framework and downstream analytical outputs.

This matters because headline renewable fuels capacity and realistic SAF capacity are not the same thing. A multi-product facility may produce renewable diesel, SAF, naphtha, or other co-products, and those volumes should not be collapsed into one undifferentiated SAF number. The tracker therefore preserves the distinction between total facility capacity, disclosed SAF capacity, and modelled SAF capacity before applying any scenario logic.

All capacity figures are standardised to kilotonnes per year using defined conversion assumptions for barrels per day, US gallons, cubic metres, and selected CAPEX currency conversions where relevant. Where capacity is derived rather than directly disclosed, that treatment is documented in the project record.

How project stages are defined

Not all SAF projects are equal. A facility in commercial production today is fundamentally different from an early concept with no engineering commitment, financing, or construction progress. Treating both as equivalent inflates pipeline numbers and can create a misleading impression of likely deliverable supply.

Each project is assigned to one of eight mutually exclusive stages based on the highest-quality available evidence, not on developer language alone: Operating, Construction, FID, Pre-FID, Announced, Pilot/Demonstration, On hold / delayed, and Cancelled. Stage assignment is evidence-based and conservative. For example, an EPC announcement does not by itself place a project under construction unless physical works are clearly underway, and first production of on-spec fuel does not automatically qualify a facility as fully operating if commercial production has not yet been confirmed.

How probabilities and scenarios are applied

The tracker uses a two-tier probability framework. Each project stage carries a baseline commissioning probability, but that baseline can be adjusted at the individual project level where project-specific evidence supports a different risk profile. This produces a more useful risk-adjusted view of the pipeline than a rigid stage-only lookup. Operating and Cancelled projects are fixed at their respective endpoints and are not adjusted.

Analyst adjustments are applied conservatively and only within documented ranges. Every probability assignment carries a stated basis, and non-default adjustments require an explicit rationale tied to project-specific evidence such as financing strength, operator credibility, technology maturity, policy support, or verification quality. If that rationale becomes stale or is contradicted by new evidence, the project reverts to the stage baseline until reviewed again.

The tracker applies three scenarios to the modelled SAF pipeline. The base scenario is the primary analytical metric and applies each project’s commissioning probability to modelled SAF capacity. The bear scenario adds a second layer of downside stress through an exposure framework that considers developer, financing, technology, and policy risk. The bull scenario assumes full modelled capacity for active projects, a partial recovery case for on-hold projects, and zero contribution from cancelled projects. Together, these scenarios help separate gross announced pipeline from more realistic supply ranges.

How feedstocks are handled

Feedstock data is normalised to a controlled vocabulary of nine categories while preserving verbatim source language in the underlying project record. The core categories include UCO, animal fats, PFAD, vegetable oils, mixed waste oils, MSW/RDF, alcohol feedstock, CO2 plus green hydrogen for PtL, and industrial off-gases. Where a project uses more than one feedstock family, all relevant categories are recorded.

Feedstock demand is estimated using pathway-specific conversion yield ratios rather than a flat default feedstock-to-fuel factor. Hydroprocessing, co-processing, ATJ, MTJ, Fischer-Tropsch, and other pathways each carry distinct yield assumptions reflecting differences in conversion efficiency. Where a project discloses explicit feedstock intake through operator documentation or financing materials, that disclosed figure overrides the modelled estimate and the departure is flagged.

For multi-feedstock projects, demand is allocated across primary, secondary, and other feedstock families using a structured flexibility framework rather than a simple single-bucket assumption. This improves comparability when analysing feedstock competition across pathways, regions, and project types.

SAF taxonomy and timeline logic

The tracker uses a two-axis classification framework. SAF category captures the carbon source, distinguishing HEFA, e-SAF, and bio-SAF. Conversion process captures the technology route, such as hydroprocessing, co-processing, ATJ, MTJ, Fischer-Tropsch, or other pathways. Together, these two dimensions allow market-level aggregation without losing the technical logic behind individual projects.

Each project also carries three timeline anchors: the earliest deliverable year, the estimated start year where no disclosed start year exists, and the full run-rate year. Formula-based timeline estimation is used only where public disclosure is incomplete, with stage-based offsets applied conservatively and ramp-up periods differentiated where the pathway warrants it. This helps avoid overstating near-term supply from early-stage or technically complex projects.

Sources, verification, and confidence

Primary sources are prioritised wherever possible. These include operator or developer press releases, technology licensor announcements, EPC award disclosures, government and certification body releases, and project finance documentation. Reputable trade press and market intelligence publications are used as supporting sources where appropriate, but the source hierarchy is explicit and conservative. Technology licensor attribution is assigned only where it is explicitly stated in a primary source or in the licensor’s own disclosure. It is not inferred from industry norms. Where credible sources conflict on capacity, stage, or project status, the conflict is flagged in the project record rather than silently resolved.

Each project is also assigned a confidence level of High, Medium, Low, or Watchlist to reflect the quality and completeness of the available evidence base. Confidence level does not directly determine weighted capacity, which is driven by stage and analyst adjustment, but it is used as a qualitative signal where evidence quality materially affects interpretation. Project rows also carry verification and review dates so stale records can be identified and prioritised for re-checking before they are used in published outputs.

What is not claimed

The tracker is not presented as a complete census of global SAF activity. It is an evidence-based project universe built to support disciplined comparative analysis. As a result, numbers published through this platform should not be interpreted as complete global supply totals or as a substitute for company-level diligence, regulatory filings, or project finance documentation. The purpose of the tracker is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to make it more visible, more structured, and more analytically useful.

A living dataset

The SAF Project Tracker is version-controlled and updated on a rolling basis as new evidence becomes available. Project additions, status changes, probability revisions, capacity updates, confidence adjustments, and methodology refinements are incorporated through regular review cycles. Each project record carries verification metadata, and stale records are flagged for priority re-verification. The current public methodology published in April 2026.

Questions about methodology or data sourcing can be directed through the publication contact channel.

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Axial Intelligence is an independent publication focused on the global buildout of sustainable aviation fuel, or SAF.

The publication tracks SAF projects worldwide, including operating plants, facilities under construction, and announced developments. The goal is to provide a clearer view of how the industry is actually evolving.

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Rather than relying on headline announcements, Axial Intelligence focuses on project-level analysis, examining factors such as capacity, timelines, technology pathways, and project credibility.

The objective is simple: to provide a more decision-useful view of the SAF market than headline capacity announcements alone.

This publication is designed for professionals working across the SAF ecosystem, including airlines, investors, lenders, refiners, technology developers, consultants, and strategy teams.

Paid subscribers receive premium SAF intelligence, including curated tracker extracts, periodic updates on the global SAF project pipeline, and analytical notes on key developments in the market.

Axial Intelligence focuses exclusively on SAF project intelligence.